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THE BRAIN: PHYSIOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS 
OF EVALUATION AND MEMORY 
JEFF C. SCHANK 
Department of Philosophy 
University of Nebraska-Lincoln 
Lincoln, Nebraska 68588 
Behavioristic axiomatizations of human evaluation have been well 
established (von Newmann and Morgenstern, 1953; Leinfellner, 1969). 
The axiomatization of the evaluative interpretation scheme can be ap-
plied to the historical sciences and provides a model of historical time. 
Newtonian time can be defined by imposing a strict serial order on 
temporal events by means of the relations of simultaneity and succes-
sion, which has been axiomatized recently (Leinfellner, 1966). The 
former axiomatization of the structure of evaluation can be combined 
with the latter axiomatization of the structure of temporally ordered 
memory, based on preference and indifference relations of an individ-
ual as he evaluates past events or future possible events. The author's 
intention is to go a step further and incorporate the organization of the 
brain as foundations of memory time and evaluation. In recent pUblica-
tions, Pribram (1976) showed that the organization of the brain fulfills 
the requirements of the von Newmann and Morgenstern axiomatization 
of evaluation. Further, research has shown that memory is correlated 
with certain biochemical changes in the brain. In short, we obtain a 
new solution for the mind-body problem with respect to evaluative 
behavior and decision-making, especially with respect to evaluation of 
an individual's history. 
t t t 
INTRODUCTION 
When considering an individual's history, the historical 
and, in general, the social sciences have asked why events of 
an individual's history occurred (Leinfellner, 1973). This 
problem has been approached by a strict causal or determin-
~tic ordering of events, objects, and actions from past to future 
as sufficient for an explanation of a person's history. But 
problems arise with this approach to an individual's history. 
For example: 
A person learns a language (ae) in anticipation of the 
prospect of immigrating in the near future to the country 
where this language is spoken. In such a case he will 
evaluate learning this language very highly according to 
an activist's attitude. But if this same individual after 
arriving in this new country becomes involved in an 
accident, he may devalue this same act of the past (ae) 
after he has experienced all the troubles which were 
consequences of the accident (l..einfellner, 1973). 
This example illustrates the importance of evaluation in a 
person's history, while also illustrating the inadequacy of 
causal or deterministic orderings of events as an explanation 
of a person's history. Therefore, instead of asking why events 
of an individual's history occurred, we should ask why an 
individual evaluated an event in a particular way. 
In this paper, evidence from brain research is used to 
develop foundations for behavioristic axiomatizations of 
evaluation and memory time (i.e., those events which are 
represented in the brain and temporally ordered). If the 
organization of the brain fulfills the requirements of the axio-
matizations of evaluation and memory time, then there are 
inbuilt orientation schemata which are called value spaces for 
value orientation and individual decision-making, and memory 
spaces for time orientation. Both value and memory spaces 
can be combined to form an orientation scheme which is 
called historical time for evaluation of past events (retrospects) 
or future possible events (prospects). In short, I will show that 
the organization of the brain fulfills the axiomatizations of 
evaluation and memory time which can be combined to defme 
one of the more common spaces human beings evaluate and 
make decisions about with respect to their individual histories. 
In order to show that historical time is an innate space 
for evaluation and decision-making with regard to the past 
or future of an individual, I will, for simplicity, separately 
develop the brain foundations for the axiomatization of 
evaluation and then the axiomatization of memory time. But 
first, I will examine what a space is, and how the axiomatiza-
tions of evaluation, memory time, and evaluation and memory 
time combined (historical time) satisfy the requirements of a 
space. 
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Leinfellner (unpublished) outlined the fundamental 
assumptions which every adequate defmition of a space should 
fulfill. 
Fundamental assumptions about spaces: 
1. A space should be describable by empirically valid 
statements called empirical spatial descriptions which belong 
to an empirical language. 
2. A space should be either the intuitive order or the 
abstract conceptual form of (1) and may be called the order 
function of spaces. 
3. A space should be defmable as a system of mathema-
tical or abstract objects with relations defined between them. 
This is the structural conception of spaces described by a 
theoretical language . 
4. A space should be a two-fold system of subsystems. 
There are in most cases three subsystems consisting of "an 
empirical space" having a recognizable intuitive order, capable 
of an abstract definition. 
Definition of a space: A space can be defmed as any 
system of subsystems, or any system of representation, if it is 
a basic or epistemological structure and if: 
5. At least one structural description is empirical. 
6. At least one of the relations R: is at least a quasi 
series founding relation and one R., where i = j and 1 ;;:. i, 
j;;:' 1 is an identity relation. J 
7. At least one of the representation functions is a 
measurement function. 
Therefore, the structures of evaluation and memory time, 
defined axiomatically, are value and memory spaces respec-
tively if and only if the following conditions are fulfilled: 
First, the axiomatic definitions of evaluation and memory 
time must fulfill the definition of a space and parts (2) and 
(3) of the fundamental assumptions about spaces. Second, the 
interpretations of the axioms defining evaluation and memory 
time must fulfill parts (1) and (4) of the fundamental assump-
tions about spaces. The axiomatizations of evaluation and 
memory time satisfy the requirements of a space; thus histori-
cal time, defined by a combined axiomatization of evaluation 
and memory time, satisfies the requiremcnts of a space (Lein-
fellner, 1973 and unpublished). 
BRAIN FUNCTION: A TWO-PROCESS MECHANISM 
Before developing the brain's physiological foundations of 
cvaluation and memory time, it will be useful to briefly 
ISS 
examine Pribram's systems approach to brain function. Th' } b . . IS approac 1 assumes two aSlc processes, I.e., operators (nerv 
impulses) and states (neuroelectric). Classically, the neUro e 
has been viewed as the sole organizer of the nervous syste n 
but Sherrington's (1906) work with the complexities of t~; 
reflex demonstrated the importance of the properties of th 
synapse (e.g., the slow potential microstructure). The distinc~ 
tion between nerve impulses and graded slow potentials is 
stated succinctly by Pribram (1971): 
The present emphasis is on the slow potentials them. 
selves; the suggestion is that the slow potentials prodUce 
patterns which serve a function in addition to a role in 
impulse transmission: the view taken here is that the slow 
potential pattern "computes" both the spatial neighbor. 
hood interactions among neural elements and, to Some 
extent, the temporal interactions over a range of sites by 
a continuous (analogue) rather than a discrete, all-or-none 
(digital) mechanism (Pribram, 1971). 
Moreover, Pribram and Gill (1976) have outlined the basic 
logic of the two-process mechanism of brain function: 
The most generally known innovation in control theory 
has been the formal description of the concept of feed. 
back (e.g., see Miller, Galunter and Pribram, 1960), a 
circular process initiated by a test, a matching of two 
settings. When there is a mismatch, one of the settings 
becomes fixed while the other triggers an operation which 
continues until a match is produced. Thus a test-operate· 
test-exist sequence, a TOTE, characterizes the feedback: 
for example, if the setting of a thermostat and that of 
room temperature are incongruent, i.e. mismatch, a fur· 
nace is either turned on or off until congruence is estab· 
lished. 
More recently, anuther, equally useful conception, 
fccdforward (e.g., S0C l'ribram, 1(71) has been found 
important. In fcedforward control, an operation proceeds 
to a predetermined end point. For example, in most 
apartments, the furnace continues to operate for fixed 
periods, irrespective of local temperature conditions 
(Pribram and Gill, 1976). 
BRAIN MECHANISMS OF A VALUE SPACE 
Since my purpose in this section is to develop the neuro· 
logical foundations of a value space, only a limited set of 
axioms (Leinfellner, unpublished) will be considered for 
simplicity (for a complete set of axioms, see Leinfellner, 
19(9). The set ofaxioms is divided into three groups: mixture, 
order, and measurement. 
<x, P; >-. '\/) def1nes the structure of evaluation (V) if 
and only if the following condit ions are fulfilled. 
Axiom 1. For any tuble (xI' x2' ... , xn) to which PI' P2' 
.. , Pn can be adjoined, where P(el) = PI' P(e2) = P2, ... , 
. n 
p(en) '" Pn and 0 <; P(ei) <; I and for which tPi = I, the mix· 
ture of xI' x2' ... , xn with probabilities PI' P2' ... , Pn denoted 
bY (Pj xI' P2x2' ... , Pnxn) is a uniquely defined element of V. 
Interpretation: A value xi is ascribed by a person under certain 
conditions at a time, t, to objects, actions, and events ai 
which indicates a relative place xi the object possesses within 
the ranking order xl' x2' ... , xn · Thus, if an individual can 
adduce the appropriate probabilities PI' P2' ... , PI1' he can also 
match the probabilities with the values. 
We need to assume that human beings as well as higher 
animals have an innate tendency to improve and refine-evalua-
tion judgments (Leinfellner, unpublished). This assumption is 
needed because it explains and justifies an important char-
acteristic of a value space, i.e, to be a mixture space. A mix-
ture space involves the use of probability by an individual in 
refining evaluations. Since human beings are able to sharpen 
and refine evaluations, each justification of evaluation is a 
justification of probability, and thus evaluation and probabil-
ity are mutually interdependent and subjective. 
Pribram (1976) has taken the first step towards the devel-
opment of the brain mechanisms for evaluation, i.e., by show-
ing a basis in the brain for the axiomatization of evaluation by 
von l\cwmann and Morgenstern (1953). Although similar to 
the axiomatization presented here, their axiomatization is not 
complete. Nevertheless, much of the development of the neuro-
logical foundations of von Newmann and Morgenstern's utility 
theory is applicable to the axiomatization of evaluation 
presented here. 
Values (Pribram, 1976) are expressed by need-satisfying 
behaviors. In other words, values have their basis in biological 
needs; a quantification of internal controls over behavior lead-
ing t(\ the satisfaction of biological needs. The mechanisms 
which control biological needs can be classified into three 
major categories. The first mechanism regulates the amount of 
appropriate behavior engaged in, and is called the satiety 
mechanism. A second mechanism readies the individual to 
behave in a particular manner and initiates the appropriate 
behaVior. The third mechanism coordinates the other two 
mechanisms into a smoothly running system. 
The satiety mechanism is organized by a closed-looped 
feedback process. Research (Pribram and Bagshaw, 1953) 
showed that monkeys with a removed amygadala failed to 
have a cutoff point beyond which they would refuse non-
preferred objects, while unoperated monkeys did have a cutoff 
Point. This indicated that the amygadala controls the amount 
of behavior that satisfies a biological need once it is initiatcd. 
The readiness mechanism is organized by a helical-loop feed-
forward process, operating similar to a dial on a thermostat. 
This mechanism processes information because alternatives 
are involved, e.g., the dial setting of a thermostat involves the 
alternatives "off" and "on." Research (Anand and Brobeck, 
1952) has shown that rats with a damaged far-lateral hypo-
thalamus starved to death. This suggested that the far-lateral 
hypothalamus controls the amount of behavior that is ini-
tiated. The coordination mechanism shifts control from the 
feedback to the feedforward process. Anand (1963) showed 
that the satiety and the readiness mechanisms for feeding are 
reciprocally coupled. His experiments showed that when the 
satiety mechanism was active the readiness mechanism was 
inhibited. 
Furthermore, probabilities are an individual's estimate of 
the likelihood that the occurrence of particular behaviors will 
satisfy particular needs. Research has demonstrated a mech-
anism which estimates the probability that the occurrence of 
a particular need-satisfying behavior will satisfy a biological 
need. Evidence supporting a probability estimating mechanism 
comes from monkeys with resectioned frontal lobes. These 
monkeys were unable to distribute their responses probabilis-
tically from prior experiences, as do non-resectioned monkeys 
(Pribram, 1961). Moreover, for the axiomatization of evalua-
tion discussed here, we must show that the amount of needs 
and desires, and the estimate of probability, are multiplica-
tively related and mutually interdependent. Pribram (1976) 
supported a multiplicative relation between values and proba-
bilities by the close link between the brain systems regulating 
values and the brain systems involved in probability estima-
tion. This close link, both anatomically and functionally, of 
these brain systems also indicates their mutual interdepen-
dence. 
Axiom 2. The subspace (V, >-, 'V) is quasi-ordered. 
Interpretation: "V" is the set of values; ">-" is the prefer-
ence relation; "'V" is the indifference relation. 
Brain mechanisms involved in establishing preferences 
have been shown to be separate from those regulating the satis-
faction of biological needs and the estimation of probability 
(Pribram, 1976). Pribram (1969) showed that removal of areas 
remote from those mechanisms involved in need-satisfaction 
and the estimation of probability interfere with discrimina-
tion of choices between cues. This discrimination of choices 
has been shown (Irwin, 1958) to indicate preferences. Pre-
ferences are then dependent on a mechanism which involves 
the ability to discriminate between situations that lead to satis-
faction, and thus are situation dependent, reflecting the 
invariant properties of the situation. Therefore, the use of 
"signs" is required, i.e., the mechanism by which preferences 
become organized. "Signs are made and recognized when 
motor mechanisms operate on the junctional patterns initiated 
by input. ... Signs become communicative acts that remain 
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invariant over a large variety of contexts. . . " (Pribram, 
1971). 
Axiom 3. If xi >- Xj >- xk' there exists a p such that 
Xj "v (pxi' (1 - P)xk)' Interpretation: If an individual reveals 
his preferences in the following manner: P(ai' aj) and P(aj , ak) 
where (>-/P) , and if one is indifferent between a mixture 
(pxi' (I - p )xk) and Xj' the probability, p, indicates the relative 
interval: xk - x/xk - Xi' 
This axiom, if empirically valid, entails linear transforma-
tional properties and makes a value space into a measurement 
space. The mixture of need-satisfying behavior must be mea-
surable by at least an ordinal scale and at most an interval 
scale. Pribram (I976) proposed that values are measurable in 
terms of the amount of behavior needed in their satisfaction, 
provided a "zero" point is agreed upon. 
These axioms, based on the organization of the brain, 
show that a value space is an innate mechanism of value 
orientation and individual decision-making. It is not assumed 
that the evaluator is an idealized figure with unlimited logical 
faculties and computational capacities. In individual decision-
making, computation requires the use of a finite number of 
symbols or tokens in describing events of one's environment. 
Pribram (I 971) has described how symbols develop: 
These develop when the brain's motor mechanisms be-
come engaged in perception and feeling. The resulting 
coding operations construct signs and symbols ... sym-
bols, when motor mechanisms operate on junctional 
core-brain receptive processes. _ .. Symbol communica-
tion almost completely depends on the context in which 
symbols occur. (Pribram, 1971)_ 
BRAIN MECHANISMS OF A MEMORY SPACE 
A memory space is defined by an order axiom which de-
mands some minimal properties for establishing a temporal 
order of memory by the relations of simultaneity and succes-
sion. Leiilfellner (I 966) axiomatized serial time which we now 
apply to memory time. 
(M; >, = ) defines the structure of a temporal memory 
order. 
Axiom 4_ 3.1 For any ml e M, ml = m1; 3.2 For any 
ml' m2 e M, if ml = m2' then m2 = mI; 3.3 For any ml' 
m2, m3 eM, if mi = m2 and m2 = m3' then mi = m3; 3.4 For 
any mI' m2 e M, if MI > m2' then not (m2 > mI ); 3.5 For 
any mI' m2' m3 e M, then not (m i = m2) if and only if mi > 
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m2 or m2 > mI' Interpretation: "M" is a set of memories 
stored in the brain; ">" is the succession relation; "=" is the 
simultaneity relation. 
To demonstrate a neurological basis for a memory space 
there should be brain mechanisms satisfying the followin ' 
requirements: (a) external stimuli must be encoded int~ 
neural representations, (b) neural representations of external 
stimuli must be stored, (c) it must be possible to retrieve speci. 
fic stored experiences, (d) retrieved information must he 
decoded into a state which recreates the original experience 
(e) it must be possible to recognize external stimuli from pre: 
viously stored experiences, and (f) memories must be ordered 
in the brain. 
Coding operations of external stimuli take place in the 
nervous system when physical energy is sensed by receptors 
and transformed into nerve impulses. When nerve impulses 
reach synaptic networks, the discrete signals become enCoded 
in the slow potential microstructure (Pribram, 1971). Two 
classes of codes are involved; i.e., codes involving nerve im. 
pulses and codes involving slow potentials. Impulse coding 
uses both temporal and spatial codes, and are "read" by a 
mechanism in the central nervous system. This readout of the 
impulse-coded messages takes place in the neural junctions, in 
the production of slow potential microstructure, resulting in 
momentary states. Further, two classes of transfer functions 
are employed by the readout mechanism. Some transfer func· 
tions allow reversibility, i.e., a one-to-one mapping between 
ciphers of a code. Other transfer functions are irreversible 
unless a key exists to decipher a code, e.g., the alphabet. 
It is a characteristic of states that they are modifiable. 
Therefore, permanent modifiability of coded neural represen· 
tations should be possible. The process of chemical induction 
has been proposed as a model of permanent memory storage. 
The process of neural induction is similar to the process that 
takes place during embryological development of an organism. 
The relation between inductor and substrate is stated by 
Pribram (1971): 
1. Inductors evoke and organize the genetic potential 
of the organism. 
2. Inductors are relatively specific as to the character 
they evoke but are relatively non-specific relative to 
individuals and tissues. 
3. Inductors determine the broad outlines of the 
ind uced character; details are specified by action of the 
substrate. 
4. Inductors do not just trigger development; they 
are a special class of stimuli. 
5. Inductors must be in contact with their substrate 
in order to be effective; however, mere contact is insuffi· 
cient to produce the effect-the tissue must be readY, 
must be competent to react. 
6. Indaction usually proceeds by a two-way interac-
t;un, by a chemical conversation between inductor and 
subst rate (Pribram, 1971). 
Neural induction is initiated by intermediate memory mech· 
;nis!TIS, Excitation of nerves starts the production of neural 
RNA whjch induces configurational changes by chemical 
"convcr::ltions." These chemical conversations are reversible 
and (':ii! fade, unless maintained by repetition of the same 
pattern, 
Jr! jIe brain, neural inducticm accomplishes permanent 
Olodil'j,lbility of neural tissue in three ways (Pribram, 1971). 
IhMn (1976) outlined a mechanism of chemical storage, 
I\~en '-,il individual learns a sufficiently difficult task, a short· 
production of protein starts, and involves at least two 
; one is called the SlOO protein. Furthe!, at least two 
are synthesized in the membranes of I he synap· 
long lasting nerve cell changes involve protein 
cbanges which become inscribed in a certain pattern 
membrane of millions of neurons. An!)t her mode of 
modi! is neural grmvth. Neurons have growth cones 
whicL i, given an open path, elongate the nerve fiber tip. 
EvLii (Rose, Malis, and Baker, 196]) showed that neural 
i,; possible and appears to bccllhanced a rich ex-
(Iknnett Diumund, Krech, ,mel Rosencweig, 19(4). 
Fina!h neuroglia plays a role in neural modifiability. It may 
be "ligudendroglia direct the growth cones of neurons. 
Evii,i c!<;,,; f,-,'m the peripheral nervous system shuwed Thilt 
SChWdldl cells, a close relative of glia, guide the direction 
the ;.'l'}wth of nerve l1bcrs that regenerate after injury. In 
shon. any (d' the three basic lllUlk, of neural modifiabilny 
arc as a change in the microstructure of junctional 
Sllh\ i ',kntial activity, 
\",. now tUnt to the probh'lll of how It is pussible to 
recall and to recognize specific inf()IJllatiun and decode 
it illtu a state which recreates the original experience. In 
order to accomplish this, there should be an organizing process 
which allows stored information to be decoded into an 
experknce that recreates the original experience. Pribram 
(1971) proposed that the junctional microstructure of slow 
potentials provides this organization. He derived a model 
of neural organization from the optical process of holo-
graphy. 
A neural holographic mechanism of information storage 
rests on two assumptions: First, neural representations of in-
put are not photographic, but consist initially of a set of 
feature detectors and a set of transformations similar to those 
for the optical process of holography. Neural holographic 
images result from interference patterns; i.e., when arrival 
patterns converge from at least two sources their designs pro-
duce interference (conveniently viewed in wave-mechanical 
terms). Second, assume that these interference patterns of 
postsynaptic patterns are coordinate with awareness. It then 
follows that information is distributed over the entire extent 
of the neural pattern similar to that of a physical hologram. 
Nevertheless, a major difficulty with a neural holographic 
mechanism arises; i.e., "brain waves" as presently recorded are 
insufficient for a significant interference pattern, since brain 
waves carry only a small amount of information (Pribram, 
1971 ), 
With a neural holographic mechanism of information stor-
age, we can detail the mechanisms of recall and recognition. 
The mechanism of recall involves a feedforward process, while 
recognition is a content-addressable feedback mechanism. 
During recall, a stimulating event triggers a short·term memory 
mechanism. Retrieval requires simply the repetition of the 
pattern or essential features of it which originally induced 
storage resulting in an interference pattern of the junctional 
slow potential microstructure which recreates the original 
experience. On the other hand, during recognition short-term 
memory is often not involved; images can be reconstructed 
even from input that only partially replicates stored infor-
mation. Juxtaposition of input and long-term memory is en-
tailed in recognition, a best fit is quickly attained through 
cross-correlatio!ls among simultaneously occurring and inter-
fering wave fronts of slow potentials. A neural holographic 
process of recall and recognition has the advantage of doing 
away wilh the need for keeping track of where information 
is stored, because content can be recalled or recognized with-
out reference to location. 
Memory, however, also tells us in which direction we 
move through time; we remember the past but not the future. 
Then, somehow, memory is temporally ordered. A directed 
graph model of memory storage would impose a temporal 
order or directional order to memory engrams, fulfilling the 
axiomatization of memory time, since directed graph models 
can be mapped onto set-theoretical models (lIaJ'ary, Norman, 
and Cartright, 1965). Engrams would not be required to have a 
particular location in the brain; all that is required is a direc-
tional ordering of engrams. Lashley (1958) proposed that 
tonic activity (neuroelectric states) provides memory storage 
with its directional character: 
The background of tonic activity would determine the 
direction of attention and of the flow of thought, restrict-
ing it to related associations. It would provide the binding 
force that holds together the temporal sequences through 
memory span, and more permanent associations (Lashley, 
1958). 
Now we can make the following conjecture: the direction-
al character of memory is imposed by the junctional micro-
structure of slow potentials, conveniently viewed by a directed 
graph model. A directed graph model of memory storage is 
compatible with existing evidence and with a neural holo-
graphic process. 
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6. Indaction usually proceeds by a two-way interac-
t;un, by a chemical conversation between inductor and 
subst rate (Pribram, 1971). 
Neural induction is initiated by intermediate memory mech· 
;nis!TIS, Excitation of nerves starts the production of neural 
RNA whjch induces configurational changes by chemical 
"convcr::ltions." These chemical conversations are reversible 
and (':ii! fade, unless maintained by repetition of the same 
pattern, 
Jr! jIe brain, neural inducticm accomplishes permanent 
Olodil'j,lbility of neural tissue in three ways (Pribram, 1971). 
IhMn (1976) outlined a mechanism of chemical storage, 
I\~en '-,il individual learns a sufficiently difficult task, a short· 
production of protein starts, and involves at least two 
; one is called the SlOO protein. Furthe!, at least two 
are synthesized in the membranes of I he synap· 
long lasting nerve cell changes involve protein 
cbanges which become inscribed in a certain pattern 
membrane of millions of neurons. An!)t her mode of 
modi! is neural grmvth. Neurons have growth cones 
whicL i, given an open path, elongate the nerve fiber tip. 
EvLii (Rose, Malis, and Baker, 196]) showed that neural 
i,; possible and appears to bccllhanced a rich ex-
(Iknnett Diumund, Krech, ,mel Rosencweig, 19(4). 
Fina!h neuroglia plays a role in neural modifiability. It may 
be "ligudendroglia direct the growth cones of neurons. 
Evii,i c!<;,,; f,-,'m the peripheral nervous system shuwed Thilt 
SChWdldl cells, a close relative of glia, guide the direction 
the ;.'l'}wth of nerve l1bcrs that regenerate after injury. In 
shon. any (d' the three basic lllUlk, of neural modifiabilny 
arc as a change in the microstructure of junctional 
Sllh\ i ',kntial activity, 
\",. now tUnt to the probh'lll of how It is pussible to 
recall and to recognize specific inf()IJllatiun and decode 
it illtu a state which recreates the original experience. In 
order to accomplish this, there should be an organizing process 
which allows stored information to be decoded into an 
experknce that recreates the original experience. Pribram 
(1971) proposed that the junctional microstructure of slow 
potentials provides this organization. He derived a model 
of neural organization from the optical process of holo-
graphy. 
A neural holographic mechanism of information storage 
rests on two assumptions: First, neural representations of in-
put are not photographic, but consist initially of a set of 
feature detectors and a set of transformations similar to those 
for the optical process of holography. Neural holographic 
images result from interference patterns; i.e., when arrival 
patterns converge from at least two sources their designs pro-
duce interference (conveniently viewed in wave-mechanical 
terms). Second, assume that these interference patterns of 
postsynaptic patterns are coordinate with awareness. It then 
follows that information is distributed over the entire extent 
of the neural pattern similar to that of a physical hologram. 
Nevertheless, a major difficulty with a neural holographic 
mechanism arises; i.e., "brain waves" as presently recorded are 
insufficient for a significant interference pattern, since brain 
waves carry only a small amount of information (Pribram, 
1971 ), 
With a neural holographic mechanism of information stor-
age, we can detail the mechanisms of recall and recognition. 
The mechanism of recall involves a feedforward process, while 
recognition is a content-addressable feedback mechanism. 
During recall, a stimulating event triggers a short·term memory 
mechanism. Retrieval requires simply the repetition of the 
pattern or essential features of it which originally induced 
storage resulting in an interference pattern of the junctional 
slow potential microstructure which recreates the original 
experience. On the other hand, during recognition short-term 
memory is often not involved; images can be reconstructed 
even from input that only partially replicates stored infor-
mation. Juxtaposition of input and long-term memory is en-
tailed in recognition, a best fit is quickly attained through 
cross-correlatio!ls among simultaneously occurring and inter-
fering wave fronts of slow potentials. A neural holographic 
process of recall and recognition has the advantage of doing 
away wilh the need for keeping track of where information 
is stored, because content can be recalled or recognized with-
out reference to location. 
Memory, however, also tells us in which direction we 
move through time; we remember the past but not the future. 
Then, somehow, memory is temporally ordered. A directed 
graph model of memory storage would impose a temporal 
order or directional order to memory engrams, fulfilling the 
axiomatization of memory time, since directed graph models 
can be mapped onto set-theoretical models (lIaJ'ary, Norman, 
and Cartright, 1965). Engrams would not be required to have a 
particular location in the brain; all that is required is a direc-
tional ordering of engrams. Lashley (1958) proposed that 
tonic activity (neuroelectric states) provides memory storage 
with its directional character: 
The background of tonic activity would determine the 
direction of attention and of the flow of thought, restrict-
ing it to related associations. It would provide the binding 
force that holds together the temporal sequences through 
memory span, and more permanent associations (Lashley, 
1958). 
Now we can make the following conjecture: the direction-
al character of memory is imposed by the junctional micro-
structure of slow potentials, conveniently viewed by a directed 
graph model. A directed graph model of memory storage is 
compatible with existing evidence and with a neural holo-
graphic process. 
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